Federated database systems solve the problem of sharing information among independent entities. When building and operating such a federated database system, it is necessary to protect data. Because of heterogeneities among security systems of component databases an integration of them is essential, taking into account new security features of the federation itself. This paper describes a multilevel security policies integration methodology to endow tightly coupled federated database systems with a multilevel security system. So, taking into account the different preexisting multilevel systems of the component databases, an ordered set of classification levels for the multilevel security system of the federation is generated. The proposal is based on a schema integration process and it obtains, in a semi-automatic form, not only the ordered set but also the translation functions between each ordered set belonging to each component database and the federated ordered set. The proposed methodology also includes a way to solve the problem of classification of the components of the Federated Schema generated during the integration process.
Introduction
The growing need for information sharing, among independent entities which have their own database systems, is often solved by a Federated DataBase System (FDBS) ( [SL90] ). There are different aspects to take into account when building and operating such a FDBS: one of them is data protection.
Database systems usually use access control mechanisms to ensure the confidentiality of data. Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC) have been the most used access control mechanisms so far, and they can be distinguished depending on how access rights are specified and enforced ( [DJ94] ). MultiLevel Security (MLS, [BL75] ) is the most popular technique among those that apply a MAC mechanism.
Although the independent entities, named Component DataBases (CDBs), have their own access control mechanisms, accesses to the federated system need take into account not only security features of CDBs, but also security features of the federation. Therefore, the use of a security system with the corresponding access control mechanism, which belongs to the federated system itself, is essential ( [Per93] ). The mechanism used by our FDBS to protect data, and more particularly to allow or forbid access, is MLS, because its own operation not only helps to control access but also to control information flow.
A FDBS can be tightly coupled or loosely coupled ([SL90] ). Since we deal with strict access control policies, such as MLS, we assume tightly coupled FDBSs only, with administrators at the federated level. We present a methodology of integration of security policies to be used in building tightly coupled federated systems by CDBs integration. Each CDB can have a security system that uses DAC or MAC to control access. However, at this stage, our methodology hypothesizes that all CDBs use MLS.
The main concepts and notation used in this paper to describe the methodology can be found in section 2. Section 3 presents the sequence used to integrate more than two MLS systems, because the methodology takes into account only two MLS systems to be integrated at the same time. Section 4 lists the related work, and section 5 presents the main characteristics of the schema integration methodology, upon which our methodology of integration of MLS systems is based. The core of the paper is in section 6 and contains the development of the proposed methodology. The paper ends with conclusions and future work in section 7.
Main concepts and notation
A MLS system assigns a clearance level to each subject and a confidentiality level to each object. Levels assigned to subjects and objects should belong to either a partial or linear (total) ordered set, or a lattice of classification levels 1 . At this stage we assume that every system uses a linear ordered set. It is necessary to take into account that the binary relation of the ordered set shows what level is more confidential than others are.
Given S L = {unclassified, confidential, secret, top-secret} the set of classification levels, and ≤ L the binary relation of order among them (reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric), where
is the ordered set of system classification levels.
The natural manner to represent an ordered set is through a Hasse diagram ([SM77] ). In figure 2.1 we can see the Hasse diagram related to the (S L , ≤ L ) ordered set.
The cardinality of an ordered set is the number of elements that are members of the set of classification levels. The cardinality of (S L , ≤ L ) is four (|S L | = 4).
When a FDBS is built it is necessary to take into account that although different preexistent CDBs have a MLS system, it is impossible to presume that their ordered sets of classification levels could coincide neither on the number of levels (cardinality), nor on confidentiality meaning ( [MLTS92, DJ94] ). That is why it is essential to have a mechanism that helps in obtaining the ordered set of the federation MLS system itself (from now on we will call it federated ordered set). As accesses at the federated level are subject to the mechanisms that CDBs have to protect data, the federated ordered set of classification levels must take into account the preexistent ordered sets. So the CDBs integration process has to make an integration process of ordered sets of classification levels of distinct preexistent MLS systems.
As an integration of ordered sets of classification levels we understand the process needed to deduce the equivalence among classification levels belonging to different ordered sets. It is important to note that it is possible that a level member of a specific ordered set does not coincide with any levels belonging to whichever of the remainder ordered sets to integrate.
Taking into account that classifications at the component level must be maintained at the federated level, the conclusion is that the federated ordered set needs to have at least the same number of classification levels as the ordered set having the biggest number of classification levels of all ordered sets. Moreover, in the worst case it is possible that the federated ordered set has as many classification levels as the sum of all ordered set cardinalities, due to the possibility of lack of any equivalence among classification levels of distinct ordered sets.
Given (S i , ≤ i ), i = 1,…,N, the ordered sets of the N preexisting CDBs, each S i represents the set of classification levels of its correspondent CDB, and each ≤ i is a binary relation that defines the order among elements of S i . Through integration process of ordered sets, we obtain a new ordered set (S F , ≤ F ) (federated ordered set) where S F is the set of classification levels of the federated MLS system and ≤ F is the binary relation that indicates the order among elements of S F . The cardinality of S F (| S F |) is bounded by the cardinalities of S i (| S i |):
depending on the quantity of classification levels from an ordered set that coincide with any classification level of another ordered set.
With the help of the integration process the federated ordered set (S F , ≤ F ) is obtained, and also the translation functions (f i , i=1,…,N). A translation function allow us to translate each classification level from an ordered set to the federated ordered set with the preservation of the order from original ordered set:
Integration sequence
It is assumed that the integration process takes into account only two ordered sets, simplifying the solution of the problem. The integration of a large number of initial ordered sets (N ordered sets) is done by repeating the same integration process in pairs. The process is repeated for N-1 iterations following an appropriate sequence of the ordered sets.
To impose the sequence of different ordered sets to integrate, we use the following strategy. The federated ordered set will have at least the same number of classification levels as the ordered set with larger cardinality (as we said previously). So, the first application of the process is carried out by taking as entrant two ordered sets of the highest cardinality or two of the larger cardinality (depending on if there are more than one ordered set that have highest cardinality or if there is only one). Later, the process is repeated using, as entrant ordered sets, the federated ordered set obtained from the previous process, and one of the larger cardinality among remaining ordered sets. Figure 3 .1 shows through a schema how the obtained integration sequence is in ladder, but not balanced or in binary iteration (sequences defined in [BLN86] ).
The use of this ladder integration sequence allows obtaining the greatest possible number of classification levels of S F from the beginning of the process. Thanks to this fact, it is more likely that classification levels belonging to ordered sets with little cardinality, coincide with some classification levels previously defined for the provisional federated ordered set. If there were not any coincidence, then new classification levels of the federated ordered set would be generated.
Related work
There are different related works in the literature but they do not deal with a complete solution to the problem. In [IGQ94] a methodology is presented to solve conflicts related to confidentiality, produced during the integration of databases to build a federated system. The methodology is an extension, taking into account security aspects, of a technique used to create a global data schema for heterogeneous database systems. As initial hypothesis the security systems of CDBs use MLS systems, with identical ordered sets of classification levels, so the problem is reduced to the resolution of the classification of each object belonging to global data schema.
Gong and Qian ( [GQ96] ) studied the problem of secure interoperation among heterogeneous systems related to access control mechanism, in order to guarantee obtaining a possible maximum secure interoperation (maximize the quantity of information that can be obtained through the interoperable system). This study insists on the detection and resolution of the security breaches caused by the interoperation, although it starts from the base that the administrator of the FDBS, for example, has previously solved mappings between security attributes, and between distinct heterogeneous security systems.
The techniques presented in [BSS96] allow obtaining a unified ordered set through a way of combining different ordered sets that preserves a set of interoperation security constraints. The paper does not indicate how to obtain the set of interoperation security constraints on which these techniques are based. There are other works related to access control in FDBSs, although they do not apply MLS but some DAC mechanism.
The schema integration methodology
[GSSC95] describes a schema integration methodology based on BLOOM (BarceLona Object Oriented Model, [CSGS94] ) that allows obtaining a Federated Schema (according to five levels schema architecture defined in [SL90] , and also according to our seven levels schema architecture described in [ROSC97] ). The BLOOM data model is used because it is a semantically rich model (it has distinct kinds of specializations and aggregations) capable of expressing not only semantics already expressed in local schemas, but also additional semantics very useful for integration tasks. The schema integration methodology is divided into three phases:
S Semantic Enrichment: enriches semantically local schemas of the CDBs, which were expressed by some traditional models. It starts with a step of knowledge acquisition that allows discovering implicit knowledge through an analysis of dependencies. The second step is a conversion, where the local schemas augmented with the knowledge previously discovered are converted into rich Component Schemas expressed in our Canonical Data Model (CDM, [SL90] ) BLOOM. S Detection: identifies semantically related objects (that belong to different CDBs), through a comparison process guided by a strategy. The strategy operates at two levels: at the coarse level the strategy identifies pairs of specializations to be compared, taking into account the generalization dimension, and at the fine level the strategy identifies pairs of classes to be compared based in the aggregation dimension. Later, a criterion, based on aggregation dimension too, is used to yield a degree of similarity between the pair of classes. S Resolution: integrates the BLOOM schemas of the CDBs after identification of semantically related objects. The basic integrator operation is a discriminated form of generalization named discriminated generalization. In this variant of generalization, the description of the superclass inherits upwards the description of its subclasses (it takes the union of their abstractions), and each object of a subclass, seen as a member of the superclass, has a discriminant attribute. The discriminant attribute is used for integration purposes and it takes as value the name of the database where it comes from.
The security policies integration methodology
Our security policies integration methodology complements the schema integration methodology presented in the previous section, in such a way to allow us to get:
S the federated ordered set S the translation functions between ordered sets S the classification of the Federated Schema, which is a result of integration process, according to the obtained federated ordered set.
Our methodology produces, in a semi-automatic form, a federated ordered set that only needs to be validated by the federated system administrator, to be used as the ordered set of the MLS system of the federation. If the ordered set does not get the administrator's validation, the integration process would generate a new federated ordered set proposal in order to be validated by the administrator. Validation can be total or partial; so from a partial validation new proposals can be generated until total validation is obtained. This is because when different ordered sets are integrated there are distinct combinations that can be used as federated ordered set.
The analysis and validation of all possible combinations among classification levels of distinct ordered sets would require lots of administrator's effort. To reduce the number of combinations to analyze by the administrator, our integration process takes advantage of the information related to the data classification stored in Export Schemas (according to [SL90, ROSC97] ), as well as the information obtained by schema integration process.
Although it is also necessary to complement the semantic enrichment phase to reach a complete integration of CDBs, this paper focuses on the two last phases of schema integration methodology. Particularly, the detection phase, properly complemented, yields the federated ordered set and the translation functions (thanks to the validation of the administrator). Besides, after complementing the resolution phase, this will allow classifying the components of the Federated Schema.
Detection phase
The detection phase of the schema integration methodology (presented in section 5) produces semantic relationships between components of different Export Schemas and also a Conformed Schema for each Export Schema. The Conformed Schema of each Export Schema defines the schema in a convenient manner for the resolution phase. .1 introduces a simple example that allows remembering the operation of the schema integration methodology, and then it is used to illustrate our security policies integration methodology. Specifically, figure 6.1 describes the Export Schemas of CDB1 and CDB2, their ordered sets of classification levels, and also the classification of each component of the schemas as well. The ordered set integration process uses the information of the semantic assertions. So, with the initial information of ordered sets of CDBs to integrate and assertions obtained by detection phase, the proposal of a federated ordered set is originated in order to let administrator validate it.
Taking into account the hypothesis of homogeneous integration (CDBs belong to the same universe of discourse) it is logical to presume that interest in information privacy will be similar. For that:
1. in an E-SR it is assumed that classification levels of classes which are considered equivalent concepts, are equivalent classification levels. 2. in an S-SR it is assumed that the classification level of the superconcept is ≤ than the classification level of the concept (according to [ML92, IGQ94] a concept always has to be classified at a level ≥ than the superconcept, because concept needs to inherit superconcept characteristics).
For the analysis and representation of all information, needed by the ordered set integration process, a multiple directed graph (digraph ( [SM77] ) where multiple arcs are allowed between two vertices, multidigraph) is used. The multidigraph is built from Hasse diagrams, which define initial ordered sets to integrate, and necessary arcs corresponding to different assertions obtained by detection phase. The source and target of each arc belong to distinct ordered sets. The representation of each semantic assertion is the following:
1. for each E-SR an arc from the classification level of a class to the classification level of the other class is added to the multidigraph; and also the inverse arc. 2. for each S-SR an arc from the classification level of the superconcept to the classification level of the concept is added to the multidigraph.
It is important to note that all assertions are taken into account, although they seem redundant or produce conflicts, without any verification. The reason for this is to ensure the use of the greater quantity of information, because the feasibility study of each arc, originated from semantic assertions, before its addition to the multidigraph, could produce a final multidigraph with less quantity of information. Each arc produces some conflict depending on the other arcs of the multidigraph, so if the multidigraph is not complete the decision whether to add or to remove an arc could affect further inclusions or removals of other arcs.
According to the example introduced in figures 6.1 and 6.2, from the Hasse diagrams of ordered sets (S 1 , ≤ 1 ), (S 2 , ≤ 2 ), and arcs needed to represent assertions (E-SR, People-Person), (E-SR, Unemployed-Unemployed), (E-SR, Student-Student), (S-SR, Employee-Administrative) and (S-SR, Employee-Worker) the multidigraph shown in figure 6 .3 is obtained. of initial ordered sets. Because an arc can be incompatible with different arcs, and at the same time these arcs can be incompatible with others, it is necessary to use a mechanism to determine which is the more incompatible arc. As a mechanism we use a penalization system based on the detection of cycles with more than two participant vertices. To obtain the federated ordered set from the multidigraph it is necessary to do the following steps:
1. To remove, iteratively, the more penalized arc from the multidigraph. The elimination of an arc implies the updating of the penalization of other arcs that were affected by the existence of the eliminated arc. 2. To replace cycles that have two participant vertices, belonging to different ordered sets, by only one vertex. Two vertices participate in a cycle if
∈ S j , i≠ j.
3. To convert the multidigraph obtained into an ordered set. Table 6 .1 (a) After calculating the corresponding penalizations of distinct arcs of the multidigraph shown in figure 6 .3, we obtain the penalizations shown in table 6.1 (a). The arc which must be deleted is (L13, L22), because it is the arc with larger penalization. When arc (L13, L22) is deleted then the penalizations of others arcs change to the penalizations of table 6.1 (b). This time, the arc more penalized is (L12, L22), and after removing it the remaining arcs do not have any penalization. So, the resultant multidigraph is that is in figure 6.5. After replacing vertices involved in a cycle by only one vertex, the digraph shown in figure 6 .6 is obtained. It is important to note that arc (L23-L12, L24) is not necessary because they are deduced from the final digraph. So, the obtained digraph defines the federated ordered set to be used by MLS security system of the federation (if it is validated by the administrator), where S F = {L21, L22-L11, L23-L12, L13, L24}, | S F | = 5 y ≤ F = {(L21, L22-L11), (L22-L11, L23-L12), (L23-L12, L13), (L13, L24)}.
The translation functions f 1 and f 2 obtained through the application of the methodology are defined as:
To finalize the CDBs integration process it is necessary to solve the classification of the components of the integrated schemas, taking into account the classifications of the components of the initial schemas and the federated ordered set of classification levels as well as the translation functions obtained. This resolution of classifications has to be carried out by the complemented resolution phase of the schema integration methodology. 
Resolution phase
The resolution phase of the schema integration methodology gets the Federated Schema after the integration of the Export Schemas of the CDBs. By use of the discriminant generalization similar classes are integrated whenever specializations to which they belong are similar too. Taking up again the example in figures 6.1 and 6.2, after the resolution phase, the resultant Federated Schema corresponds with the schema shown in figure 6.7. The class Employee_db2 has been created as a conformation of CDB1 and CDB2. At the moment, in this schema only the classification of the components of the initial schemas appears.
To classify the Federated Schema taking into account the federated ordered set, it is necessary to perform the following steps:
1. To update the original classifications of Federated Schema components, which already appear in Export Schemas, applying the translation functions obtained in the detection phase. 2. To classify components that were originated by the use of the discriminant generalization, taking into account these conditions: a) if the classification levels of all subclasses are the same then the superclass is classified at the same level of the subclasses. b) if subclasses are classified at different levels then the superclass is classified at the least confidential level where subclasses are classified. c) it is important to note, as a special property of the discriminant generalization, that when a superclass inherits upwards the union of the abstractions of all its subclasses, a multilevel classified superclass is obtained, although classes of CDBs were not multilevel classified. If an abstraction only appears in a subclass then its original classification level is maintained (with the corresponding translation). Otherwise, an abstraction that appears in several subclasses will be upward inherited depending on its semantics. If classification levels of the subclass abstractions are distinct then abstractions are semantically different, so they will be upward inherited as different abstractions (maintaining its classification levels). According to [GQ96] , a federated/interoperable system has to comply with the following principles:
1. Principle of autonomy: any access permitted within an individual system must be also permitted under secure interoperation. 2. Principle of security: any access not permitted within an individual system must be also denied under secure interoperation.
Let's see how both principles are fulfilled if FDBS uses the classified Federated Schema shown in figure 6.8. Remembering another time the CDBs introduced in figure 6.1, a user of the CDB1 having the clearance level L11 can only access class People. If the same user, having the same clearance level, was a user of the federation, after applying the corresponding translation function the equivalent clearance level obtained is level L22-L11. So, through the federated system this user can also only access the class People (from CDB1). Besides, the same user can access the information of the federation related to Fpeople_person Table 6 .2 summarizes every case. The first column of the table indicates the referenced CDB, the other four columns, in pairs, show clearance level and accessible data by the use of this clearance level, at component system and at federated system respectively. Each row assumes a user having the corresponding clearance level.
Conclusions and future work
Our security policies integration process methodology allows us to integrate, in a semiautomatic form, different CDBs taking into account data protection. This data protection aspect is only slightly studied in the federated system field. The process of the methodology presented in this paper integrates CDBs that have MLS as security systems, but the main difference with the proposal presented in [IGQ94] is that the integration is performed although ordered sets of classification levels of different systems do not coincide. Besides, as in [IGQ94] , the proposed methodology complements a schema integration methodology, so it can offer a very important support to the administrator of a federated system; contrary to the proposals presented in [GQ96, BSS96] where an administrator, or somebody else, has to establish mappings between distinct ordered sets.
At present, we are working on the study of all incompatibility cases between multidigraph arcs. It is essential to define all possible penalizations, and also criteria to choose which arc has to be removed if there are different arcs with the same penalization. These tasks will allow us to obtain a correct multidigraph to convert it into a federated ordered set. Another work is related to using our methodology having partial ordered sets or lattices.
Other future work includes the complementation of the semantic enrichment phase to make a complete process of CDBs integration; as well as a possible adaptation of the proposed methodology to integrate other kind of security systems different from MLS (DAC, RBAC).
